Unfortunately, his reasonableness could only muster a four justice minority in Ali v. Federal Bureau of Prisons et al. The two sharpest legal minds on the court (Scalia and Ginsburg) both voted in the majority and against him. I think he makes a good argument, though:
The word “any” is of no help because all speakers (including writers and legislators) who use general words such as “all,” “any,” “never,” and “none” normally rely upon context to indicate the limits of time and place within which they intend those words to do their linguistic work. And with the possible exception of the assertion of a universal truth, say by a mathematician, scientist, philosopher, or theologian, such limits almost always exist. When I call out to my wife, “There isn’t any butter,” I do not mean, “There isn’t any butter in town.” The context makes clear to her that I am talking about the contents of our refrigerator. That is to say, it is context, not a dictionary, that sets the boundaries of time, place, and circumstance within which words such as “any” will apply.
Breyer expands on this view of statutory interpretation in Active Liberty (it's a quick read, if you're into this kind of thing). I used to think this was a flawed and "unintellectual" approach (for one, Breyer's approach can't be summarized in a cool Latin phrase like ejusdem generis or noscitur a sociis), but I am slowly coming around. Legislators aren't logicians, and so we probably shouldn't interpret the laws they write as if they were perfectly logical documents. I think most normal people would interpret the law below as limited to claims against only customs and excise officers and any other law enforcement officers acting in a customs or excise capacity:
“claim[s] arising in respect of the assessment or collection of any tax or customs duty, or the detention of any goods, merchandise, or other property by any officer of customs or excise or any other law enforcement officer.” 28 U. S. C. §2680(c).
